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ESEA TITLE I
LITIGATION-UPDATE
CHARLES

H. WILSON, ESQUIRE

Since the PEARL case' was filed in 1976, a cloud has hovered over
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Although the progress of a number of pending title I cases has been slow,
there should be some elucidation in the very near future. Presently, the
term "title I" is somewhat of a misnomer. In 1981, Title I of ESEA was
re-enacted as Chapter One of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 which in turn became part of Subtitle D of Title V of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.2 That is a real mouthful
if you are trying to find the shorthand reference. For purposes of this
presentation, the program will continue to be referred to as the title I
program.
This presentation will consist of a brief summary of the status of the
pending title I cases and a brief prognosis of where they may be heading.
At last year's meeting five cases were listed and discussed." Those cases
again will serve as the foundation for the title I discussion. The first case,
which was pending in San Francisco, is no longer in existence. The plaintiff, United Americans for Public Schools, took a voluntary dismissal after
the Justice Department filed against the plaintiffs, both the organization
and the individual taxpayers, some very onerous discovery requests. It is
believed, however, that the plaintiff will watch carefully the development
of the other cases and may refile at a later date.
The second case, Barnes v. Bell, is pending in Louisville, Kentucky.
That case attacks directly Louisville's title I program for nonpublic school
students, but is essentially on hold at this time because lead counsel in
the case, Lee Boothby of Americans United, is somewhat preoccupied
with his role in the Wamble case. Until the Wamble case is tried and
National Coalition for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. National Coalition for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PEARL].
I Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 551, 95 Stat. 463 (codified in various sections of

20 U.S.C.).
See Wilson, ESEA Title I Litigation-A National View, 27 CATH. LAW. 231, 233-38
(1982).
S
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resolved, it is doubtful that this case will move forward at all.
The next case, Felton v. Bell, is pending in the Eastern District of
New York. At this time last year the stay entered in the case was still in
effect." A stay had issued soon after the complaint was filed pending the
outcome of PEARL and as of last year's meeting, more than -a year after
the district court decision in PEARL, no action had been taken by the
plaintiffs to lift the stay.' It was suggested to the Justice Department that
affirmative action be taken to have the stay dissolved, followed by the
filing of a motion for summary judgment based upon the PEARL record.
It was clear from the complaint in Felton that the plaintiffs were attacking the New York City title I program, the very program that was at issue
in PEARL. The federal bureauvracy dragged its heels on that strategy,
and so Leo Pfeffer moved to dissolve the stay and then entered into a
stipulation that the case be submitted on the PEARL record. The stipulation was agreed to and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.
There is some indication that the judge will simply decide the case on the
papers.
The Felton case appears to be ideal because it resurrects the PEARL
record, which is perhaps the best record that will ever be developed in a
title I case, and presents the opportunity for expeditious consideration.
If the Supreme Court will hear a title I case, it will most likely be Felton
which has and will have the best record.
That case, however, will also be a test of what has been worked out
with the Justice Department as basic strategy in title I, and that strategy
is to keep the title I issue away from the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court probably will not want to decide the constitutionality of title I, and
that result is most likely if in the case before the Court-apparently Felton-the court of appeals held title I constitutional as applied to nonpublic school students. The reason is that the only recourse to the Supreme
Court would be a petition for certiorari by Leo Pfeffer; the Court could
deny certiorari with no precedential impact. This action, hopefully, will
signal that the Court, rather than deciding the broad constitutional implications of title I, will leave the determination of particular programs to
the lower courts. If this strategy backfires and either the district court or
the Second Circuit finds title I as applied to nonpublic school children in
New York City unconstitutional, then the right to take title I up to the
Supreme Court by appeal still exists, and the Court will be forced to
reach the merits of the issue.
The fourth case, Stark v. Bell, is pending in Minnesota. The Stark
case is unique in one respect. In PEARL and in Felton, there is only one
See id. at 234.
5Id.
' Id. at 235-36.
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entity's title I program at issue. In the San Francisco case, it was unclear
whether it would be just the San Francisco program under attack or
others. Of course, in Missouri, in the Wamble case, the issue is presented
in the context of a title I bypass. In Minnesota, the plaintiff has indicated
that he intends to challenge at least ten different public school district
title I programs. In the final analysis, there could be somewhere between
ten and sixteen mini-trials, because it will be argued that each program
has to be evaluated on its own merits. The trial of the case, needless to
say, will be rather cumbersome. Fortunately, for the most part the plaintiff is focusing on small school districts, with the exception of Minneapolis and St. Paul, so the burden of the trial may not be as great as it could
otherwise be.
Whether the Minnesota case will have any long-term significance is
doubtful at this time because the Wamble case probably will reach the
Eighth Circuit first. The Wamble case indeed is the most significant of
the title I cases. It was filed in April of 1977 and remains untried. It
would be nice if the case somehow disappeared, but unfortunately it is
inexorably moving toward trial. Last year at this time, the case was hopelessly bogged down over negotiations for stipulations of fact. 7 It seemed
that the case would be bogged down indefinitely.
The case does, however, carry a 1977 filing date, and three new
judges were appointed to the Western District of Missouri in September
1981. Judge Wright, who then had the case, unloaded it to Judge Stevens,
one of the new judges. When Judge Stevens saw the 1977 date, and was
facing a rather empty docket, he stated at the first status conference in
November that he intended to put the case on the fast track afid indeed
he has.
In terms of title I litigation, this trial will be unprecedented in scope.
The plaintiff wants to offer twenty-six deposition transcripts and the testimony of twenty-five live witnesses. There will be seventeen additional
witnesses on the defendant's side. Also, a large number of documents
have been designated by the plaintiff as trial exhibits. The plaintiff
claims, in no uncertain terms, that he will prove that the Catholic Church
is hierarchical.
One of the real difficulties in the case is that Judge Stevens, acting
on a motion for a partial judgment on the pleadings based on a standing
issue, ruled that the plaintiff has standing not only to challenge the constitutionality of the title I bypass as it is now being operated in Missouri,
but also to contest whether the United States Commissioner of Education
made the right decision in implementing the bypass. The ruling that the
plaintiff can challenge the decision to invoke the bypass makes it almost
7

See id. at 233-34.
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essential to relitigate Barrerav. Wheeler.8 This is due to the fact that the
Commissioner based his decision to bypass in Missouri on a factual finding that nonpublic schools in that state were not receiving services comparable to the services provided to public school students. That was the
very issue in Wheeler. It is now necessary to develop evidence, presented
in Wheeler, that in the 1970-1971 school year, the Kansas City public
school district spent an average of $240 per public school child but an
average of only $10 for nonpublic schoolchildren.
The problems in the Wamble case, from the beginning, have been
enormous. Coping with the great number of exhibits and many thousands
of pages of deposition testimony, in addition to the various objections
that have accompanied such discovery, has been no easy task. Some of
the comments made by Judge Stevens at various sessions with him make
the outcome of the case quite unpredictable.
That in brief is the status of title I litigation. It is fair to predict that
by the fall of 1983, there will be, at least, district court decisions in the
Felton and Wamble cases, and possibly a decision in Minnesota. Those
cases will then be progressing up the appellate ladder to some sort of
confrontation in the Supreme Court.

a 475

F.2d 1338, 1355-56 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that title I programs for Kansas City parochial schools were not comparable to those in public schools and remanding for the establishment of guidelines for the proper implementation of title I programs), affd, 417 U.S. 402
(1974), modified, 422 U.S. 1004 (1975).

